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1. Introduction
*
 
We're really trying our best to create the best platform in the world for you to 
express your talents and make a living too. If it sounds like we're control 
freaks, well, maybe it's because we're so committed to our users and making 
sure they have a quality experience with our products. Just like almost all of 
you are too.  
(Apple, ‘iOS App Store Review Guidelines’)1 
 
When assessing the ‘smartphone’ (Internet-connected devices with both telephone 
and computing functions, typically equipped with a touch screen or keyboard) sector 
or market, control matters. The manufacturer of the device benefits from 
implementing a controlled environment for applications (‘apps’), so that the user is 
reassured by their experience of using it.
2
 In work on control and the DVD platform, 
Gillespie described the DVD sector as being difficult to criticise because 'no single 
element of this arrangement is solely responsible for its consequences, or for its 
missteps’.3 This is an apt description of the multi-faceted strategy of those who 
develop smartphone and app stores (e.g. Apple), which relies, as will be shown in this 
article, on statute, contract and more in order to be effective. As such, Gillespie’s 
approach of looking at the exercise of control through different tools and upon 
different players (e.g. the network of relations between users, developers, 
manufacturers, and others) can be followed, but with special attention paid to how law 
facilitates control. In common with the commercial enterprises involved in the 
development of DVD, the strategy of Apple and its competitors cannot be described 
as being capable of functioning without relying upon existing law, as it depends on 
relevant provisions in order to protect and sustain a particular vision for the 
platform(s).  
Indeed, disputes can and do arise between the manager of a platform and the third-
party developers who would wish to provide apps to users of that device. These 
                                            
* Thanks to Emily Laidlaw, Eric Goldman, Lilian Edwards, Morten Hviid, Robert Sugden, Richard 
Cadman, Judith Rauhofer, Lisa Ramsay, Michael Froomkin, Oles Andriychuk and the anonymous 
reviewers for comments. Drafts presented at the 2011 Policy Forum of the Society for Computers & 
Law, the 2012 Internet Law Scholars Works-in-Progress workshop at New York Law School, the 
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia, and as a guest lecture at the 
University of Strathclyde. 
1
 Apple, ‘iOS App Store Review Guidelines’ (12 September 2012) 
<https://developer.apple.com/appstore/guidelines.html>. This statement has been widely reproduced 
online, e.g. D Caolo, ‘Apple’s App Store Review Guidelines: some juicy bits’ (The Unofficial Apple 
Weblog 9 September 2010) <http://www.tuaw.com/2010/09/09/apples-app-store-review-guidelines-
some-juicy-bits/>.  
2
 Mark de Reuver, ‘Governance of mobile service innovation after the walled gardens’ (2011) 13 info 
43, 44. 
3
 Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut (MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2007) 169. 
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proceed along various (and sometimes overlapping) lines. So although the 
marketplaces for apps are successful and many opportunities are available for 
developers to promote and sell their products, this does not negate the need for the 
relationship between store operators and app developers to be scrutinised; this is the 
subject of part 2 of this article). The focus is on Apple’s iOS App Store and 
(primarily) the iPhone. As Apple has taken a deliberate, conscious decision to ‘police’ 
its store, its decisions have been the most visible contests over control and power in 
the public arena. Just as the rhetoric of new media has overstated the idea of 
disintermediation, without due regard to the persistence of intermediary control over 
content and commerce
4
 or the combination of personalisation and bias that replaces 
one filter with another,
5
 tributes to the new opportunities presented by app platforms 
run the risk of playing down the significance of Apple’s role.  This is then developed, 
in part 3, through consideration of the degree to which the success of apps prompts 
the consideration of the relevance of consumer and privacy laws.  The purpose of 
doing so is to provide a truly critical analysis of freedom and control in the app 
‘space’ which reflects the tripartite relationship between the platform operator, the 
app developer, and the consumer. 
The smartphone has been used as the basis for exploring new markets, business 
models, competition problems and the limits of intellectual property
6
 and is the 
subject of a small number of cases.
7
 Zittrain’s exploration of generativity takes the 
iPhone as a key case study, discussing its launch on its first page and returning to it as 
a quintessentially ‘tethered’ appliance;8 Grimmelmann and Ohm, in turn, reviewed 
Zittrain’s book and discussed the symbolic role of the iPhone within the theory of 
generativity and the reception of the book.
9
 Naughton pursues a similar theme; the 
iPhone is 'functional, enjoyable and perhaps even beautiful - but wholly or largely 
under someone else's control'.
10
 Finally, Wu describes what he calls the ‘Cycle’ of 
open innovation emerging from a closed context but often itself becoming closed in 
due course,
11
 and (of particular interest regarding apps) argues that successful services 
have been developed without control of infrastructure, but remain vulnerable to the 
actions of others
12
 
                                            
4
 Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless world (OUP, New 
York 2006). 
5
 Eli Pariser, The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you (Viking, London 2011). 
6
 E.g. Douglas MacMillan, ‘Inside the app economy’ (Business Week 22 October 2009); James 
Grimmelmann, ‘Owning the stack: the legal war to control the smartphone platform’ (Ars Technica 
September 2011) <http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/09/owning-the-stack-the-legal-war-
for-control-of-the-smartphone-platform.ars> accessed 1 December 2012; Chuck Martin, The Third 
Screen: marketing to your customers in a world gone mobile (Nicholas Brealey, Boston 2011).  
7
 Menno Cox, ‘Apple's exclusive distribution agreements: a refusal to supply?’ (2012) 33 ECLR 11; 
Fabien Fontaine, ‘French antitrust law and strategic analysis: apples and oranges?’ (2009) 30 ECLR 
286 
8
 Jonathan Zittrain, The future of the Internet: and how to stop it (paperback edn Penguin, London 
2009) 1-2; 101. 
9
 James Grimmelmann & Paul Ohm, ‘Dr. Generative or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the iPhone’ (2010) 69 Maryland Law Review 910, 917-921. 
10
 John Naughton, From Gutenberg to Zuckerberg: what you really need to know about the Internet 
(Quercus, London 2012) 285. 
11
 Tim Wu, The master switch: the rise and fall of information empires (Atlantic, London 2010) 6-7. 
12
 Ibid 284-5. 
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Models of regulation presented in this article, particularly those pertaining to 
electronic programme guides and for premium rate telephone services (PRS), can 
therefore contribute to the debate on the role of the iOS App Store and other app 
stores, although the technological and cultural differences between the app market 
and markets such as PRS mean that the objective of this exercise is to understand 
regulatory goals and tools rather than fitting apps within an existing category. The 
suggestion that existing tools in relation to consumer and privacy rights be used or 
extended is made in order to ascertain how public authorities could promote open 
platforms, or more precisely to minimise the (non-natural) advantage of closed 
platforms. As closed platforms already rely upon certain laws so as to remain closed, 
and apps on both open and closed platforms are already subject to various laws, it 
would not be a case of an unregulated space falling under new State control. Instead, 
this article will argue that laws could be used to promote user and developer rights, 
even if harm to competition is not demonstrated to the extent that a competition 
remedy would be appropriate. 
The academic interest in smartphones is premised in part on a claim regarding the 
significance of smartphones, so it is appropriate to note the current state of the market 
in brief, before proceeding to the substantive analysis in part 2. Smartphones have 
come to prominence in the mobile phone market over a short period, prompting 
debate on the legal, cultural and commercial significance of the sector and the iPhone 
in particular.
13. In the US and in some European states, close to half of all ‘phones’ 
are smartphones, and the proportion has exceeded half in the UK.
14
 Younger users are 
adopting smartphones at a faster rate than others,
15
 and around 60% of current 
smartphone owners in the UK acquired their first smartphone within the last year.
16
 
The popularity of smartphones and of tablets (e.g. the iPad, which uses the same 
operating system as the iPhone) forms part of a broader realignment in the hardware 
sector, following the peak and subsequent decline of the sale of personal computers in 
industrialised or developed states.
17
 Some smartphones use an operating system 
devised by the manufacturer (e.g. Apple’s iPhone and iOS), but many devices share a 
third-party operating system (e.g. the range of devices running the Android OS). The 
Android OS is now the most widely used operating system, although the iPhone 
remained the most popular single device. Smartphones also form a part of the shift in 
Internet access from fixed to mobile. Already, the total number of mobile broadband 
subscriptions (including smartphones) in the world is twice the total of fixed 
                                            
13
 See in particular Brian Chen, Always on: how the iPhone unlocked the anything-anytime-anywhere 
future – and locked us in (Da Capo, Cambridge (MA) 2011). 
14
 51.3%: Comscore, ‘Mobile future in focus’ (23 February 2012) 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations_Whitepapers/2012/2012_Mobile_Future_in_Fo
cus 16, accessed 1 December 2012. 
15
 Ofcom (the regulatory agency for broadcasting and telecommunications in the UK) reports that a 
quarter of phones in use in the UK are smartphones, but that proportion rises to half in the case of users 
aged 16-24: Ofcom, ‘Communications Market Review 2011’ 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr11/UK_CMR_2011_FINAL.pdf 47-8, 
accessed 1 December 2012. 
16
 Ibid 194. 
17
 Charles Arthur, ‘PC sales dip year-on-year as ultrabooks fail to stave off economic woes’ (Guardian 
12 July 2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2012/jul/12/pc-sales-dip-ultrabooks-
windows-8> accessed 1 December 2012.  
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broadband subscriptions
18
 (although a fixed connection may be shared with multiple 
users and/or be able to offer higher speeds). Even the UK tax authorities have had to 
consider the classification of smartphones, exploring the boundary between phones 
and computers.
19
 
A key consequence of this shift from phone to smartphone has been the development 
of the market for apps, which is the subject of this article and an opportunity to 
consider alternative responses to Zittrain’s provocation on the choice between open 
and closed models. For present purposes, a simple definition of apps is adopted, i.e. 
applications (including those developed by third parties) which run on a smartphone. 
In general, they are distributed through large retail platforms such as the Apple App 
Store or the Android Market. Some apps are free, others require the payment of a fee 
for download, and an important third category is apps that are free to download but 
require or permit in-app payment for additional content or functionality. There are 
early examples of app stores provided by mobile phone networks (such as DoCoMo 
in Japan)
20
, but in relation to smartphone and tablets, there has been significant 
expansion and development in recent years. There are currently over a million apps 
available,
21
 including 550,000 in the iOS app store
22
 and 450,000 on the Android 
Market.
23
 Apple has ‘celebrated’ (with great fanfare) its 25th billionth download,24 and 
it is also estimated that 29 billion app downloads (across all platforms) were recorded 
in 2011.
25
  
                                            
18
 ITU, ‘Global ICT developments’ (last updated December 2011) http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/ accessed 1 December 2012; the current estimate is 8.5 fixed wired broadband 
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants and 15.7 active mobile broadband subscriptions per 100. 
19
 HMRC, ‘Revenue & Customs Brief 02/12’ (20 February 2012) 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/briefs/income-tax/brief0212.htm> accessed 1 December 2012. It previously 
treated smartphones as PDAs rather than mobile phones, which meant that they could not benefit from 
an exemption from benefit-in-kind provisions, because they were not ‘devices that are designed or 
adapted for the primary purpose of transmitting and receiving spoken messages and used in connection 
with a public electronic communications service’: Income Tax (Earnings & Pensions) Act 2003, s. 
319(4). It now states that that approach is incorrect, and accepts that because ‘many modern consumer 
PDAs are now also likely to be smartphones’, smartphones (with both telephony and Internet 
functions) meet the criteria to be considered as mobile phones, although pure PDAs will not. 
20
 NTT DoCoMo, ‘i-mode history’ <http://www.nttdocomo.com/services/imode/history/index.html> 
accessed 1 December 2012. 
21
 Shelly Freierman, ‘One Million Mobile Apps, and Counting at a Fast Pace’ (New York Times 11 
December 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/technology/one-million-apps-and-
counting.html> accessed 1 December 2012. 
22
 ——, ‘App store metrics’ http://148apps.biz/app-store-metrics/ accessed 1 December 2012. 
23
 Andy Rubin, ‘Android@Mobile World Congress: It’s all about the ecosystem’ (Google Mobile Blog 
27 February 2012) <http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2012/02/androidmobile-world-congress-its-
all.html> accessed 1 December 2012. 
24
 ——, ’25 billion app countdown’ <http://www.apple.com/itunes/25-billion-app-countdown/> 
accessed 1 March 2012 (no longer online). 
25
 ABI Research, ‘Android Overtakes Apple with 44% Worldwide Share of Mobile App Downloads’ 
(24 October 2011) <http://www.abiresearch.com/press/3799-
Android+Overtakes+Apple+with+44%25+Worldwide+Share+of+Mobile+App+Downloads> accessed 
1 December 2012.  
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2. Developer-focused issues 
2.1 Approach 
The App Store operates a preapproval process (enforced by a Developer Agreement 
and explained through Review Guidelines and Human Interface Guidelines), and it is 
this process which frequently triggers media coverage of the ‘rejection’ of an app. An 
iPhone, without modification, can only be used to download or run applications made 
available to App Store, so acceptance of an app in the iOS App Store is a critical part 
of any developer’s strategy. If approved, the revenue from an app is split, with 30% 
retained by Apple and 70% passed to the developer. 
Apps are particularly important to the market success of the iPhone and a key feature 
in both purchase decisions and actual usage.
26
 Because Apple’s system benefits from 
integration with the pre-existing iTunes Store, credit card details are already stored,
27
 
making the decision to purchase an app a very straightforward one, requiring no more 
than occasional re-entry of an existing password. Finally, because of the success of 
the iPhone, developers may find themselves complying with the more restrictive 
policies of Apple in respect of all their activities, i.e. promoting for practical and 
financial reasons an ‘App Store safe’ version on other platforms rather than creating 
separate versions for each.
28
 
Of course, other platforms are available, and indeed there are app stores with less 
detailed approval guidelines (e.g. Android Market) or without a preapproval process. 
To some extent, non-Apple smartphones are challenging Apple’s early success.29 
However, they can themselves be criticised for being ‘too open’, when problems with 
spam or fraud are detected;
30
 this theme will be considered in part 3. 
Walden and da Correggio Luciano argue that the management of the App Store is the 
‘equivalent of a printer manufacturer only allowing cartridges made by it or approved 
by it to be used in its printers since only Apps approved by Apple may be downloaded 
from the App Store to non-jailbroken iPhones’.31 It is an interesting choice of 
analogy, particularly as the question of cartridges has been the subject of mixed 
treatment in European law.
32
 However, their subsequent statement that ‘if considered 
                                            
26
 Martin (n 6) 34. 
27
 Quentin Hardy, ‘Why iPhone Shoppers Buy More Apps (New York Times: Bits Blog 16 January 
2012) <http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/16/why-iphone-shoppers-buy-more-apps/> accessed 1 
December 2012. 
28
 Chen (n 13) 96. 
29
 Kevin O’Brien, ‘Apple’s Lead in Smartphones Is Not Guaranteed’ (New York Times 26 February 
2012) <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/technology/apple-riding-high-but-for-how-long.html> 
accessed 1 December 2012. 
30
 Charles Arthur, ‘Developers express concern over pirated games on Android Market’ (Guardian 17 
March 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2011/mar/17/android-market-pirated-
games-concerns> accessed 1 December 2012.  
31
 Laíse da Correggio Luciano & Ian Walden, ‘Ensuring competition in the Clouds: The role of 
competition law?’ (QMUL Cloud Legal Project Research Paper, April 2011) 
<http://www.cloudlegal.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/Research/researchpapers/48338.html> 3-4, accessed 1 
December 2012. 
32
 E.g. the earlier Pelikan/Kyocera and Info-Lab/Ricoh decisions, where the conclusion was that 
consumers could consider the aftermarket when choosing between products on the (competitive) 
upstream market, and the more recent EFIM decision, in which the complaints of third party 
manufacturers were rejected by the Commission and a subsequent appeal dismissed by the General 
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dominant in the market, Apple’s conduct could be considered abusive as it reduces 
the choice of consumers’ demonstrates the caution with which this question is 
approached. One must, for example, consider at an early stage of analysis which 
‘market’ is referred to: is it the market for iPhones smartphones, for operating 
systems, or the market for iPhone apps? In French cases regarding arrangements 
between Apple and Orange, it was found that the combination of design and features 
made the iPhone distinct from other smartphones; lower courts had found that the 
market in question was smartphones (not all phones).
33
 
In general, the application of overarching competition law principles (e.g. abuse of 
dominance) may be difficult, not relevant for all apps,
34
 and is not the primary 
concern of this article – although the lack of a competition remedy may itself be the 
basis of a critique of the appropriateness of this system for information technology
35
 
or justify a particular approach.
36
 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)’s 
aborted investigation of the non-approval of the Google Voice app in the earlier days 
of the iPhone did not provide information on the status of the iPhone under 
competition law.
37
  
Recognising this limitation, and Wu’s finding that competition laws alone ‘are 
inadequate for the regulation of information industries’ (because the conventional 
trigger of price and related abuses is normally absent),
38
 the approach now pursued in 
this article is one of scrutinising regulatory approaches that do not depend on the use 
of general competition remedies.  Although regulating markets and protecting 
consumers through competition law may be popular, the non-applicability of 
                                                                                                                             
Court in November 2011: Decision C(2009) 4125, affirmed by Case T-296/09, EFIM v Commission. 
See further discussion in Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, ‘EC Competition Report October-
December 2009’ <http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/b3d3755c-64dd-4080-b11a-
7a7e58d9ff5e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4d8cea1c-4b49-4a47-93af-
7b77094bfc0a/EC%20Comp%20Report%204Q%202009.pdf> accessed 1 December 2012. 
33
 Cox (n 7) 18, discussing unreported decisions (Apple Sales International v Bouygues Télécom, Cour 
d'appel de Paris, 4 February 2009; France Télécom & Orange France v Bouygues Télécom, Cour de 
Cassation, 16 February 2010). 
34
 See discussion of the case of the WikiLeaks app, distinguishing between termination of an existing 
relationship and not entering into a new one (assuming dominance in an appropriate sub-market): 
Angela Daly, ‘Private power and new media: the case of the corporate suppression of WikiLeaks and 
its implications for the exercise of fundamental rights on the Internet’ in Christina Akrivopoulou & 
Nicolaos Garipidis (eds), Human Rights and Risks in the Digital Era: Globalization and the Effects of 
Information Technologies (IGI Global, Hershey (PA) 2012) 83, 87. 
35
 da Correggio Luciano & Walden (n 31) 10: ‘In the cloud computing sector, where, in the same way 
as in the ICT sector as a whole, network effects are likely to be strong, the non-applicability of 
competition law until dominance is attained could prejudice the goals of competition law’  
36
 Cox (n 7) 12: ’Any (in my view erroneous) delineation of the relevant market which renders the 
upstream supplier a non-dominant undertaking might in the future lead to anti-competitive behaviour 
remaining outside the scope of EU competition law’ 
37
 Jason Croft, ‘There's an App for Just About Anything, Except Google Voice’ (2010) 14 SMU 
Science & Technology Law Review 1; Jason Croft, ‘Mobile computing: why you may never see some 
great apps’ (2010) AIPLA Antitrust News <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601089> accessed 1 December 
2012 (both arguing that the FCC would have good reason to find against Apple); David Waterman & 
Sujin Choi, ‘Non-discrimination rules for ISPs and vertical integration: lessons from cable television’ 
(2011) 35 Telecommunications Policy 970, 977 (drawing a parallel between this investigation and the 
wider consideration of net neutrality, in the context of the degree to which regulatory intervention is 
necessary to support innovation); Grimmelmann & Ohm (n 9) 949 (as an example of where there is 
‘plenty still wrong with the iPhone’ despite moves towards generativity). 
38
 Wu (n 11) 303-4. 
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competition law in a given case should not be read as a criticism of other forms of 
regulation, particularly when the protection of consumer interests through the law on 
the sales of goods and services long predates competition law in most jurisdictions. 
The relationship between developers and the platform operator may ultimately be 
judged by what it is compared with. This is not surprising, as the user experience of 
an app store can be positioned between two existing models.  Model 1 is that of a host 
such as YouTube, where a user can visit a single site and browse and choose from a 
range of content uploaded by third parties who bear primarily responsibility for it.  
Model 2 is that of a supermarket, where the options are determined by the 
supermarket but primarily manufactured by third parties who deal with the 
supermarket rather than the end user. As well as different user experiences, and 
possible (non-legal) expectations on whether third parties can expect to be able to 
‘trade’ via the platform, there are legal differences between the models (such as 
regarding liability).  In the case of the developer, those involved in the mainstream 
games industry will have plenty of experience of approval processes, such as those 
utilised by Nintendo, which for many years refused approval to games that did not 
match the image it wished to present of the family-friendly Nintendo consoles. But 
those who are more accustomed to working through model 2, where pre-approval is 
not common (particularly if a liability regime does not require hosts to intervene in 
order to maintain immunity from legal action), will naturally struggle with the type of 
supplier-retailer relationships that farmers supplying milk to model 1 supermarkets 
are more than familiar with. Of course, both paradigms are strongly influenced by the 
applicable legal arrangements, including specific, sectoral regulation as well as 
general principles of competition law. 
 
2.2 Markets and carriers 
Prior to the development of the smartphone, mobile data access was concentrated in 
carrier-provided ‘walled gardens’.39 The term ‘carrier’ is used here to denote the 
provider of the mobile phone telecommunications service (e.g. o2 or Vodafone in the 
UK). Some secondary sources use ‘operator’ instead and this phrasing has been left 
intact where necessary. All carriers have billing arrangements (post- or pre-paid) with 
end users; most will operate a telecommunications network (interconnected with other 
networks), although some virtual operators will use the network of another carrier. A 
carrier may also be present in retail markets, e.g. high street stores. Carriers are 
typically regulated by telecommunications law and national regulatory authorities, 
and may be restricted by conditions associated with the grant of spectrum or of a 
licence to provide an electronic communications network or service. 
As de Reuver puts it in a comprehensive reflection on the age of the walled garden, 
“the main advantage walled gardens offer to end-users is a consistent end-user 
experience, because all content has the same look and feel. In addition, billing, 
security and customer support are centralized at the operator to reduce complexity for 
end-users. From an operator point-of-view, walled gardens guarantee a large share of 
the revenues and reduce the risk to become mere connectivity providers”.40 Yet how 
much of this can also describe the iOS App Store? De Reuver’s first point, a 
                                            
39
 Nicola Green & Leslie Haddon, Mobile communications: an introduction to new media (Berg, 
Oxford 2009) 146. 
40
 de Reuver (n 2) 44; internal citations omitted. 
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consistent end-user experience, is a key part of Apple’s strategy. As well as the 
Review Guidelines discussed in this article, many of which are clearly directed at 
consistency of user experience, Apple also sets out very detailed Human Interface 
Guidelines. The second point, of the centralisation of billing, security and customer 
support is more complex. Billing is indeed centralised in Apple’s case, through the 
user’s single account, although there is a separation between this billing and the 
carrier’s billing system (i.e. the mobile bill of the user).41 Indeed, it was noted in 2010 
that the key advantage of (hitherto less successful) carrier-operated app stores was 
that they could make use of the existing billing relationship between the carrier and 
the customer.
42
 Apple enforces security policy through its review guidelines (as 
discussed below), although customer support is divided between Apple and the 
developer of a given app. On de Reuver’s final argument, that walled gardens assist 
carriers in diversifying revenue streams, this too is applicable in the case of Apple, 
although of course it is ensuring that it is not just a hardware provider – appropriate, 
perhaps, for the company which dropped the ‘Computer’ from its title some years 
ago.  
It can be observed, therefore, that Apple shares some tools and objectives with 
carriers. By doing so, it may diminish the role of the carrier.
43
 However, this is not a 
like-for-like replacement, for two reasons. The first is that a number of the features of 
an carrier’s walled garden (probably the smaller part) may not be ‘inherited’ by 
Apple. The second and related reason is that for an iPhone (although not an iPod 
Touch), it is not currently possible to sideline a carrier entirely, given the nature of 
mobile phone networks. Indeed, the iPad is available with a mobile network SIM 
card. So Apple and carriers compete for influence over the user experience. 
Indeed, Apple’s role is defended by some developers through comparing it with the 
former role of carriers. The CEO of Rovio (responsible for Angry Birds) explains that 
smartphones have an advantage over previous generations of phones-as-platforms, as 
the phone company has much less influence over the range of games that are 
available;
44
 he criticises the former system as a ‘carrier-dominated Soviet model’. A 
commentator on mobile marketing argues that smartphone apps allow a direct 
relationship to be built between user and brand, instead of it being subject to the 
control of the carrier.
45
. A more nuanced approach is found in the view of a vice-
president of Skype, who noted that the customer experience is enhanced, despite some 
developer frustration with the process, by ‘having certain processes in place to 
approve apps is important, otherwise it will be a total free for all
’.46
  
                                            
41
 The significance for regulation of different billing models is considered in part 3, below. 
42
 ——, ‘Mobile industry focuses on apps’ (Screen Digest March 2010) 77. 
43
 It has been argued that contrary to criticism of the power of carriers (by those who, for example, 
favour wireless net neutrality), the success of Apple in negotiations demonstrates that this power is 
limited: Robert Hahn and others, ‘The economics of "wireless net neutrality"’ (2007) 3 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 399, 430. 
44
 Peter Cohen, ‘Angry Birds CEO: we really have Apple to thank’ (LoopInsight 28 February 2011) 
<http://www.loopinsight.com/2011/02/28/angry-birds-ceo-we-really-have-apple-to-thank/> accessed 1 
December 2012.  
45
 Martin (n 6) 3 
46
 Russ Shaw, speaking at Westminster eForum, ‘Smartphones, tablets and apps’ (London, 1 March 
2011), transcript on file with author. Declaration of interest: this comment was made in response to a 
question put by the author. 
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Carriers cannot yet be written out of the picture, either. A number of reports have 
(with varying degrees of credibility) argued that carriers are losing out to app-based 
and other alternatives to its own services, such as smartphone-based instant 
messaging replacing billed SMS and MMS,
47
 and are considering possible responses. 
In a less adversarial fashion, developers may wish to foster relationships with carriers. 
Facebook, for example, is reaching out to carriers who could, as the New York Times 
put it, ‘help it make money from its hundreds of millions of mobile users buying 
games or music on the social network’.48 Indeed, Facebook has a particular need for a 
payment platform; it would struggle, for example, to use Apple’s payment systems for 
functions of this nature, and an integrated payment platform across Facebook 
(whether on a website, smartphone, etc) would surely be popular.  
App developers more generally may, particularly if a significant number of platforms 
succeed in becoming established, see the benefits of developing a single app and 
making it available on multiple platforms. We even have a word for this already, a 
buzzword already associated with electronic media: ‘crossplatform’. This may not be 
straightforward, though, where there are differences between review guidelines and 
payment mechanisms, so it may be more like the ‘porting’ of games from one 
restricted platform to another.  
It is possible to point to the diversity of available apps as evidence that a controlled 
environment can still promote innovation, and opponents of net neutrality argue that 
non-neutral platforms such as the iOS App Store are valuable for consumers and 
innovators.
49
 However, criticism of the store and of Apple should not turn on 
innovation alone, particularly in relation to freedom of expression. We can now look 
at these guidelines in more depth. 
2.3 Review Guidelines 
Controversial aspects of the iOS App Store Review Guidelines can be divided into 
three overall ‘themes’: rejection on content grounds (including some competition-
driven restrictions), rejection on development grounds, and the regulation of 
transactions. 
2.3.1 Theme 1 
From launch, the App Store required compliance with content restrictions as a 
condition of an app being made available in the store. The system of prior scrutiny 
applies to all apps provided by parties other than Apple, whether they are free or 
charged for. In 2010, the guidelines were published (to developers), accompanied by a 
press statement from Apple,
50
 and they have become available on the Web through 
republication. 
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Some requirements go to the function of the app, particularly where that is linked with 
the use of the smartphone itself. A good example is guideline 2.4, prohibiting the use 
of the phone’s location features to control vehicles or aircraft. Others are about the 
app in its own right. Guideline 2.11 allows duplicates to be rejected, while the 
following guideline 2.12 allows for ‘not very useful’ apps or those not providing any 
‘lasting entertainment value’ to be rejected too. Here, we see Apple’s role as very 
different to that of an open platform, inserting a quality threshold rather than 
providing a platform open to all who comply with requirements of legality. Indeed, it 
goes further than the typical ‘taste’ requirements of many standard terms of use of 
web 2.0 hosting services, who may decide to go beyond the requirements of the law 
and restrict certain legal but controversial content,
51
 but otherwise not be concerned 
with the usefulness or value of the uploaded material.  
The guidelines do include the forms of content regulation akin to that of codes of 
practice utilised in the media and new media more generally. This process is 
understandably controversial, with early reports discussing the rejection of a book-
reading app which allowed access to the Kama Sutra
52
 and a ‘baby shaker’ game, 
which was at first approved and subsequently removed.
53
 In early 2010, the original 
restrictions were made more restrictive, at a time where they had not yet been 
published.
54
  
Apps that are ‘defamatory, offensive, mean-spirited, or likely to place the targeted 
individual or group in harms way’ (guideline 4.1) will be rejected. Of course, while 
defamation may be an issue for litigation, mean spirits (without more) are unlikely to 
trouble the courts. In reaction to controversial incidents, such as the pre-Guidelines 
rejection of a cartoon app by Mark Fiore
55
 (memorably reported by Wired as Apple 
banning a ‘Pulitzer-winning satirist for satire’56 and a frequently-used illustration of 
Apple’s approach to censorship),57 the current guidelines provide, curiously, that 
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‘professional political satirists and humorists are exempt from the ban on offensive or 
mean-spirited commentary’. One wonders how professional is to be interpreted in this 
context and there is no clause of this nature to be found in approval guidelines 
elsewhere. Of particular significance to the games sector (which is considered further, 
below) is guideline 15.3, which prohibits in-game ‘enemies’ from being a real 
government or corporation.  
With the launch of the iPad, further problems arose regarding Apple’s policies on 
appropriate content; the iOS guidelines remained the same, but the new opportunities 
presented to developers by the functions and screen size of the iPad was a new 
opportunity for conflict. Even an application based on James Joyce’s Ulysses, no 
stranger to censorship at the time of its first release as a work of literature a century 
ago, found itself the subject of restrictions.
58
  
New applications of the guidelines continue to be seen. Showing perhaps a further 
lack of understanding of irony, the Phone Story app (which criticised the 
manufacturing of iPhones and the labour practices of Apple’s contractors in China) 
was rejected,
59
 because it violated guidelines including the prohibition of ‘violence or 
abuse of children’ (15.2), and ‘excessively objectionable or crude content’ (16.1);60 
again, reports focused on the decision as a signal of the power exercised by Apple and 
the significance of the guidelines, as well as its availability on other platforms. 
The guidelines now appear to have entered a period of stability, although there are 
occasional changes. One which demonstrates the use of the Guidelines as a response 
to the perceived threat of regulatory intervention is new guideline 22.8 on the 
publication of drink-driving checkpoint information, inserted in response to criticism 
from senators in the United States.
61
  
2.3.2 Theme 2 
The desire for developers to make an app available on more than one platform is easy 
to understand. This was hampered, though, by guidelines introduced in early 2010, 
which required the use of Apple tools. This was seen as a particular blow to Adobe, 
which had promoted development tools where an application could be created within 
that tool and then ported with little extra effort to appropriate formats for various 
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stores.
62
 The FTC is reported to have been interested in this matter,
63
 but the criticised 
clauses in the Developer Agreement are no longer in force.
64
 These clauses also 
attracted the attention of the European Commission, which opened an investigation 
into the programming requirements, which the Commission noted ‘could have 
ultimately resulted in shutting out competition from devices running platforms other 
than Apple's’.65 It too closed its investigation after the changes of September 2010. 
More generally, it is very difficult to use the iPhone for the purpose of writing 
software. The much-praised Scratch application (used to teach principles of 
programming within computer education) could not be approved,
66
 as its very nature 
(creating code which runs within the application rather than by utilising Apple’s 
systems) violated the then Developer Agreement.
67
 This was criticised by a number of 
programmers as a long-term risk to promoting ‘tinkering’ and the development of 
computer skills by young or inexperienced users. 
2.3.3 Theme 3 
Along with the iPhone and the iOS App Store, a third integrated feature of the app 
economy is the In App Purchase system. IAPs use the same user account (and stored 
card details), but are subject to two complementary restrictions. Guideline 11.2 
requires all in-app purchases (e.g. for buying content for use within the app, or to 
unlock a level in a game) to use IAP, while guideline 11.3 prohibits the use of IAP for 
goods and services to be used outside the application. The workaround used by some 
(most obviously Amazon) of providing a link (in the app) to a website for purchase
68
 
has been blocked by Apple, with guideline 11.14 (formerly 11.13) preventing the 
approval of an app which contains a ‘buy’ button linking to the non-app purchase of 
content for use within the app. However, it remains possible, in accordance with 
guideline 11.13 for content bought outside of an app to be used within an app without 
using IAP, but the user must find their own way to purchasing it, and this only applies 
to magazines, newspapers, books, audio, music, and video. A requirement for such 
purchases to be available within the app at the same price or better is no longer 
included. 
Again, the cumulative effect of these rules may present an obstacle to crossplatform 
strategies, although the benefit for Apple (and perhaps the consumer) is that iOS 
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transactions are directly linked with the existing Apple account of the user. IAPs, of 
course, engage the 30%/70% revenue split, which has not gone unnoticed by content 
providers. 
Even more controversial are the implications for subscriptions. This is a significant 
part of the business model for some apps, such as those launched by certain news 
providers. Although not originally covered by the guidelines, the subsequent 
extension of the purchase restrictions to subscriptions makes it difficult to provide a 
non-IAP system for subscribing to content. The objections of newspapers are not just 
to the financial link with Apple but also the loss of control over the data (e.g. contact 
information) of (in-app) subscribers – a long-standing source of importance to 
newspapers.
69
 As discussed below, this has led to some drastic measures being taken 
by publishers. 
It has been shown how the Review Guidelines play a significant role in governing the 
development of apps. The main observation of this section has been that the 
guidelines pursue multiple objectives, and are modified in connection with objections 
and observations from various parties. With this exercise of power in mind, then, we 
can turn to the ways in which the guidelines can be circumvented or disregarded, 
should an objection not be dealt with through amendment. 
2.4 Challenges to the Guidelines 
2.4.1 Jailbreaking 
The reason that the Review Guidelines matter so much is that the iPhone, by design, 
will only download and run applications from the iOS App Store. Even alternative 
app stores in the form of apps have been curtailed.
70
 By modifying the operating 
system (so-called ‘jailbreaking’), a user will be able to download and run other 
(unapproved) applications directly or from third party stores. However, there are a 
number of obstacles to the widespread adoption of this approach. It may invalidate the 
user’s warranty.71 An update of the operating system will probably undo the 
modification;
72
 the update could be blocked, but this may create a security risk or 
make some functions or apps difficult to use.  
The status of modification under copyright law also makes it a less attractive 
proposition than it would otherwise be. Restrictions on the development or 
commercial exploitation of ‘devices, products or components’ which have a primary 
purpose of circumventing digital rights management or related forms of protection 
hamper the growth of jailbreaking, because it makes it difficult for non-skilled users 
(who may need to rely upon commercial products rather than on personal knowledge) 
to modify an OS or device. 
                                            
69
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In the US, the circumvention of technological protection measures that controls 
access to protected works is prohibited.
73
 However, a periodic rulemaking procedure 
allows for specified uses to be approved by the Library of Congress. In 2010, this 
procedure led to an exemption, proposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, for 
enabling operability of lawfully obtained apps with mobile phones.
74
 For the latest 
review, the EFF proposed renewal of the ‘smartphone app’ clause (revised to include 
tablets, too) as well as a new provision on modification of game consoles,
75
 and 
another organisation proposed a general clause on installation of lawfully obtained 
software on any personal computing device (including tablets and e-readers).
76
 The 
‘smartphone’ provision was renewed but without inclusion of tablets, and neither the 
proposals on consoles nor on computing devices were accepted.
77
 However, the 
process is itself an opportunity, and the lack of a process of this nature is a significant 
weakness of the European regulation of DRM.
78
 
Cases regarding the modification of computer game consoles have seen a 
demonstrable widening of the scope of copyright law, which adds to the doubt outside 
of the US.
79
 In the UK, weaker anti-circumvention provisions in respect of computer 
software, as compared with other works protected by copyright), have been 
effectively eroded through identification of the impact of modification on the 
protection of underlying works. This can entail arguing that the works of visual art in 
a game are ‘copied’ to a screen, and therefore that modification facilitates 
infringement of exclusive rights in artistic works.
80
 Even where courts find in favour 
of modification, as in Australia, legislative bodies can respond (as the Australian 
Parliament did) by narrowing the scope of the exception.
81
  So it can be noted that 
while jailbreaking could in theory serve as a constraint upon Apple’s activities 
(through making decisions under the Review Guidelines much less significant), 
copyright law as currently constituted shores up Apple’s position of power through 
making jailbreaking a legally unattractive option. 
2.4.2 Alternatives to apps 
Developers may also choose to make their products available to iPhone users outside 
of the App Store without needing the user to modify the device, often as a ‘web app’, 
i.e. a website available in the usual way but added to the home screen by the user 
alongside actual apps. Apple also advises that apps are ‘different than books or songs, 
which (it does) not curate’, remarkably advising those who want to describe sex to 
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‘write a book or a song, or create a medical app’ and those who want to criticise 
religion to ‘write a book’. 
The Financial Times took the ‘web app’ route, expressly to avoid having to comply 
with Apple’s payment requirements.82 However, this decision may still require 
serious consideration of what is being gained and lost. It was alleged in 2011 that 
‘web apps’ promoted for running from the home screen would run slowly, because of 
the lack of priority given to the JavaScript engine on the iPhone.
83
 Apps may also be 
able to run more efficiently through local storage of data
84
 and some functions may 
simply ‘work better’ in apps than as a web page.85 Non-app solutions do depend to 
some extent on the adoption of standards for smartphone websites; Facebook has 
recently noted its support for this campaign, with the New York Times noticing the 
strategic implications, explaining the issue as one of enabling browser-based apps 
‘instead of going through Apple’s and Google’s stores’.86 However, Facebook itself 
appears to have noted the shortcomings of the HTML5 route and adopted a native 
approach.
87
 
Furthermore, Apple has taken a hard line against the use of Flash,
88
 which among 
other things is the method by which a significant part of the web-based ‘casual 
games’ sector operates. Although this may represent missed sales,89 and other 
smartphones support Flash,
90
 the late Steve Jobs explained that allowing Flash would 
cause problems ranging from battery life to security to the difference between touch- 
and mouse-based operating systems. Jobs’ statement praises the openness of HTML5 
as compared with the ‘100% proprietary’ Flash. The praising of openness is of 
particular interest, in the light of the approach to the App Store discussed in this 
article. 
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2.4.3 Opening up the app store (1) 
There are various tools by which individual decisions and the overall approach of 
Apple can be challenged. At the decision level, Apple has recently introduced a 
‘Review Board’ for developers to seek the review of a decision. This does not (as 
compared, say, with the PEGI rating system for games across the European Union)
91
 
appear to provide for non-developer appeals. Discussion of rejections on the Internet 
is also not unusual, and there are sporadic attempts to catalogue rejections,
92
 although 
Apple discourages this approach: ‘(if) you run to the press and trash us, it never 
helps’.93  
Rejection decisions are never published by Apple; this is a notable difference to 
content rating preapproval systems (e.g. for films and games) and complaint-driven 
systems (e.g. for advertising), although as Apple is acting alone rather than as an 
industry-wide self-regulatory body, it is not entirely unsurprising. It remains 
interesting to note that some Web enterprises have made great steps in taking a more 
open approach to externally-driven decisions to remove content, without applying the 
same (laudable) philosophy to its own decisions. Twitter has joined Google in 
publishing DMCA takedown notices on the Chilling Effects website, which means 
that we know an awful lot about when, why and which rightsholders affect what we 
see on Twitter, but as little as ever about how Twitter affects what we see on Twitter. 
2.4.4 Opening up the app store (2) 
The regulation of electronic programme guides (EPGs) in the European Union
94
 may 
provide an interesting model for those concerned about the approval guidelines of the 
iOS App Store or of app stores more generally. EPGs facilitate user selection of TV 
services (and increasingly video-on-demand services too) through platforms such as 
cable and satellite. They are a significant part of the consumer experience of digital 
television: a good one is ‘more than just a useful tool’,95 as viewers can choose from a 
wide range of options and look at what is to be broadcast at later dates. In European 
Union telecommunications law, EPGs are a special case, with member states 
permitted by article 5(1)(b) of the Access Directive
96
 to impose access conditions on 
the provision of EPGs. This approach is known as fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (‘FRAND’), is used in other areas of IP and competition law, and 
applies in general rather than to those designated as having significant market power 
(under telecommunications law) or in a dominant position (under competition law). 
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The Directive is implemented in the UK is through section 310 of the 
Communications Act, and a code of practice drawn up by the regulator, Ofcom.
97
 
There are three key principles in the Code: ‘appropriate prominence’ for public 
service broadcasters, adjustments for disabled users, and most relevant for present 
purposes, that EPG operators make FRAND arrangements with broadcasters for 
inclusion in an EPG. This is not a right to be included, nor price regulation per se 
(although one operator is so regulated because of its market power), but a requirement 
to behave in a particular fashion when dealing with. The EPG codes of UK operators 
are easily available.
98
 Furthermore, the consideration of both s 310 of the 
Communications Act and the current Code by the High Court (in relation to an 
unsuccessful but fully argued breach of contract claim made by a television service 
provider against an EPG operator)
99
 demonstrates that the code is enforceable and 
more than an aspiration or a statement of general practices (an accusation which 
might be levelled at some codes in the field).  
Of course, guidelines are in place in the Apple system, although only available to 
developers (and to readers of websites which have received leaked copies).  Its 
pricing policy is clear (i.e. the fixed ‘cut’ taken by Apple of iOS App Store 
transactions). However, the key difference between the regimes is that the regulation 
of EPGs is based on the FRAND principle. Furthermore, European law also regulates 
(in the context of digital television) conditional access systems (i.e. payment and 
encryption for subscription TV channels) and application programme interfaces 
(which support the delivery of non-television (data) service over broadcasting 
facilities).  
2.4.5 Conclusion 
The power of Apple in respect of the iOS App Store is tempered by the ability to 
‘jailbreak’ and the opportunity to reach audiences through ‘web apps’. However, 
these responses are limited, and will require a certain degree of developer and user 
action. In terms of regulation, no obvious avenue for intervention has emerged, 
although it has been argued here that the (consumer-focused) European model of EPG 
regulation could be considered, particularly as competition law may not provide a 
remedy that satisfies the critics of Apple’s approach to control. It should be recalled 
that supporting ‘openness’ through law is already apparent. The clearest example is 
the licensing of newly-released spectrum (the 700MHz range) by the FCC in the 
United States. The award of some ‘blocks’ of spectrum is subject to openness 
requirements,
100
 which has in turn provided advocates with opportunities to challenge 
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selected examples of app store regulation.
101
 However, this does not resolve overall 
issues in relation to store-developer relations, as it is limited to certain carriers and to 
the specially designated spectrum. 
In the next section, more directly consumer-facing remedies will be considered. It will 
then be possible to see how aspects of the problems highlighted in this section can be 
addressed even in the absence of a feasible response founded on the regulation of app 
stores or review guidelines themselves. 
3. Citizen- and consumer-focused issues 
3.1.Introduction 
Smartphones and apps continue to develop as tools for ecommerce (i.e. beyond the 
purchase of the app itself). It has been observed that, so far, smartphones are more 
likely to be used for looking up prices or information rather than purchases,
102
 
although there are plenty of examples of innovative use, ranging from paying for 
pizza in a restaurant through an app
103
 (charged to card or PayPal) to the continuing 
growth of ‘virtual goods’ in games and social networking sites.104 Perhaps the 
observation that smartphones are devices for consumption
105
 is an apt one, although 
combined with the management of platforms like the iOS App Store, this would 
suggest that the ‘generative’ PC model is a very distant one. This section will 
demonstrate how it is stores other than the iOS App Store that attract most attention in 
terms of consumer and privacy issues (with the focus on consumer/payment issues, 
given the information noted in this paragraph regarding smartphones and 
ecommerce), and that – across all app stores – the scope for game and broadcast 
regulation governing apps is beginning to become apparent. 
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3.2 Electronic commerce and premium rate services 
Regulation of the app economy is under ongoing consideration in the UK, in terms of 
the law on premium rate services (PRS). PRS regulation is a departure from the 
overarching European framework for the regulation of telecommunications, which is 
no longer based on licensing, instead using a system of general conditions and 
‘authorisation’ of services. The system is backed by statute (section 120 
Communications Act 2003) but managed by an independent regulatory body, 
PhonepayPlus. It applies to content services provided through an electronic 
communications network or service, where there is a charge for the service, paid in 
the form of a charge for use to the provider of the communications network or service 
(e.g. on a phone bill) through which the service is provided. The regulatory scheme is 
primarily in terms of consumer protection (e.g. fairness in rates, maximum charges, 
dialling scams). Provisions also exist on harm and offence (less interventionist than in 
the case of broadcasting but more so than for telecommunications or Internet services 
in general), and on access by under-18s.  
Interested parties have for some time been reviewing how the remit of PhonepayPlus 
can be effective when PRS is just one of a number of forms of ‘micropayment’. In a 
letter to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, PhonepayPlus and a 
number of trade associations
106
 argued that the PRS model could be useful for other 
forms of micropayment, that there were risks associated with having different systems 
(framed in terms of weaker consumer protection and barriers to innovation).
107
  
The primary issue here is that there is a range of ways in which payments can be 
made, but only some of them fall within the terms of PRS regulation, and popular 
others (including many app stores) are clearly not covered. A report commissioned by 
PhonepayPlus and published in 2011
108
 noted the trend towards fragmentation (i.e. in 
the different forms of payment in the market), but emphasised the particular 
importance of apps, which ‘will create significant new opportunities for 
micropayments, both for purchasing apps, and for purchases of digital content and 
services within apps’.109 In the case of mobile, it identified risks of non-delivery of 
content (or poor instructions on how to download), susceptibility to unauthorised 
purchases, poor disclosure of terms and conditions or data charges, and cancellation 
problems.
110
  
PhonepayPlus has issued guidance
111
 on the application of PRS regulation to app 
payments (in three categories: for download, in-app payments and ‘freemium’ models 
                                            
106
 The Association for Interactive Mobile Entertainment (AIME), MEF (formerly the Mobile 
Entertainment Forum) and the UK Competitive Telecommunications Association (UKCTA). 
107
 Letter from Alastair Graham (chair, PhonepayPlus) to Jeremy Hunt MP (30 June 2011) 
<http://www.phonepayplus.org.uk/News-And-
Events/News/2011/6/~/media/Files/PhonepayPlus/Policy%20_Industry%20support/Final_PhonepayPlu
s_Industry_Letter_30_June_2011.pdf> accessed 1 December 2012.  
108
 Analysys Mason, ‘The marketplace for and regulation of micropayment services in the UK’ 
(December 2010) <http://www.phonepayplus.org.uk/News-And-
Events/News/2011/6/~/media/Files/PhonepayPlus/Research/Analysys_Mason_The_marketplace_for_a
nd_regulation_of_micropayment_services_in_the_UK.pdf> accessed 1 December 2012.  
109
 Ibid 31. 
110
 Ibid 76. 
111
 PhonepayPlus, ‘General guidance note: application-based payments’ (February 2012) 
<http://www.code.phonepayplus.org.uk/pdf/guidance-notes/application-based-payments.pdf> accessed 
1 December 2012.  
- 20 - 
which combine free download with optional later payment). However, this only 
applies to payments that qualify as PRS, i.e. are charged to a phone bill or pre-paid 
account, but not payments ultimately taken from a credit, debit or pre-paid card. The 
guidance deals with familiar PRS issues, such as making the charge and future 
charges clear, as well as emerging issues, such as the application of consumer 
protection provisions to virtual currency (e.g. provision of information on exchange 
rates, expiry dates). Notably, though, it is carefully tailored to the app environment, 
with provisions on consent and receipts for in-app purchases, negotiating the need to 
protect the consumer with the developer’s desire to integrate something like a ‘power-
up’ in a game into the overall game. A warning is also issued that ‘informing 
consumers of the price of extra items at the start of a video game or virtual world, and 
then charging them without further consent as soon as their avatar makes contact with 
extra items within the service’ needs positive, auditable advance consent (including 
the likely charges), if a finding of breach is to be avoided.  
Ofcom (as the parent regulator) has had to consider whether charges to mobile phone 
bills for ‘portal’ content (i.e. paid by the user to the carrier) should be treated as PRS 
(as it met the statutory test); it determined (subject to further consultation) that these 
services should not be regulated in this fashion.
112
 Services which allow third parties 
to provide content to users, with the charge ultimately appearing on the phone bill, 
would continue to be considered PRS; the main service in the UK is known as 
Payforit. Although beyond the scope of the consultation in question, it is clear that 
payments to typical app stores (including in-app payments), on the other hand, will 
fall outside of the current approach to PRS without more, as the app store is not the 
provider of the communications service (the carrier is). 
Furthermore, Ofcom in its capacity as broadcasting regulator has scrutinised the use 
of apps as payment mechanisms for audience participation.
113
 The reason for this is 
that the use of PRS in connection with broadcasting is now the subject of tight 
regulation in the UK, with an unusually specific condition included in broadcast 
licences, even requiring third party verification (as compared with the general 
approach of making compliance with the Broadcasting Code the condition and setting 
out the details of regulation in the Code). This resulted from a series of scandals in 
relation to the use of PRS, including quiz shows that appeared to do no more than 
raise revenue through ethically dubious questions, and phone-in voting that operated 
(and charged the caller) after the decision had already been made.
114
 
Illustrations of harm to consumers associated with apps can be found both in 
PhonepayPlus decisions and through consumer complaints reported in the media. A 
number of examples of the former are available in the database of PhonepayPlus 
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adjudications.
115
 The first significant case is that of Battery Booster UK, an Android 
app which after (free) download proceeded to send SMS messages to a premium rate 
shortcode. The terms and conditions of the app included the ability to send and 
receive SMS messages, but the document contained no reference to the premium rate 
service ‘subscribed’ to (for video clips). The PhonepayPlus tribunal found multiple 
violations of its Code and imposed a fine of £135,000.
116
 This particular business 
model has been at issue in other cases
117
 and has been highlighted by PhonepayPlus 
as a developing problem.
118
 Another serious case dealt with an app where agreeing to 
download the app (through two pages, the first the correct Android page and the 
second designed by the provider) triggered a chargeable text message with little 
notice to the consumer that any charge would apply; multiple breaches were recorded 
and a fine of £50,000 and other remedies determined.
119
 Fake battery boosters appear 
to be a particular source of difficulty, with another ‘free’ app, Battery Super Charger, 
being the subject of a later case, 300 complaints, and a fine of £75,000.
120
 Rules of the 
PhonepayPlus code breached in these cases included rules on pricing (e.g. failure to 
provide clear information before a purchase is made, applying a charge without proof 
of consent, omitting the required reminders for subscription services), and the general 
rule against misleading the consumer. 
A 2012 case dealt with errors in an Android video-on-demand app (TV2Go) where 
content was paid for by SMS; the result was a small fine and formal reprimand,
121
 but 
it does demonstrate that the choice of SMS payment (popular on Android where 
payment details may not be stored, but difficult on the iPhone due to Apple’s policies) 
means that formal external investigation of consumer complaints will be possible, 
where it would not be so possible for other payment methods. Further cases, with 
further fines and requirements to submit future offerings for preapproval involving (in 
part) the same payment provider (regarding compliance failures in subscription and 
unsubscription procedures) reinforce the importance of the available of this 
remedy.
122
 
Indeed, in-app payments continue to provoke a certain degree of public interest. This 
was best demonstrated in relation to the Smurfs’ Village app, which attracted 
complaints from parents after children made substantial in-app purchases of 
‘smurfberries’, with bills of over $1000 being reported.123 This is a mainstream 
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application (one of the highest ‘grossing’ in the iOS App Store)124 and, even after the 
original disclosure, continues to be the subject of news reports across the world
125
 and 
is held up as a case study for app-related consumer risk.
126
 
The clear objection to further use of a PRS-like system for apps is that it would create 
an artificial line between apps and the Internet more generally. However, if PRS or a 
version thereof is already appropriate for certain apps and for websites using Payforit, 
the artificial line is already present, and would just be adjusted rather than created 
anew. Furthermore, the support of legitimate PRS providers for the PhonepayPlus 
system, alongside other systems such as that for the regulation of advertising, may 
point towards a strategy whereby support for a fresh approach to app regulation in 
terms of consumer confidence could be presented as beneficial to developers. 
3.2 Privacy 
A range of interesting issues in relation to smartphones and privacy have also been 
observed; for present purposes, two will be noted and subsequently used in the 
analysis of what they mean for the overall analysis of app store regulation.  The first 
issue relates to the role of app stores and the second to actions taken by app 
developers. Both issues have been characterised by regular ‘incidents’ of media 
interest, but also a developing interest in the question of apps and privacy by 
regulators. 
The Federal Trade Commission is the US body responsible for consumer protection at 
the federal level. Its Bureau of Consumer Protection enforces privacy legislation and 
monitors relevant developments across all markets.  One of its areas of work relates to 
apps and alleged widespread failures to comply with the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA); the Commission has started to take action.
127
. A further 
example of regulatory dialogue using privacy law powers is at the state level, namely 
the agreement between the Attorney-General of California and six app platform 
operators (including Apple and Google). A statement noted that the California Online 
Privacy Protection Act
128
 “requires operators of commercial web sites and online 
services, including mobile apps, who collect personally identifiable information about 
Californians to conspicuously post a privacy policy”, with app-specific detail that 
users will be able to view (from a consistent place on the relevant download page) a 
privacy policy before downloading the app.
129
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The agreement also includes commitments to user education and reporting tools, but 
the most interesting facet, for the purposes of this article, is the commitment for the 
platform operators to include a field for privacy statements or links in the application 
submission / approval process for apps. This is a prudent recognition of the 
significance of the approval process, but a less benevolent reading is that it points 
towards the regulation of the approval process in the same way that other 
intermediaries are regulated so as to secure the objectives of various laws and 
policies. Indeed, the FTC is far from subtle in this regard.  Using some of the 
language of ‘privacy by design’130 and Lessig’s analysis of regulation,131 the FTC 
argues that while the iOS App Store and Android Market provide ‘the basic 
architecture’ for communicating information to users, they ‘should provide a more 
consistent way for developers to display information’ on data collection and 
interactivity, perhaps in the store itself, because ‘as gatekeepers of the app 
marketplace, the app stores should do more’.132  
The other notable feature of ‘app privacy’ is the regular highlighting of new or 
anticipated privacy problems in relation to apps. Frequently, these problems relate to 
the use of other information stored on the smartphone by an app, which recalls the 
very reasons for the success and importance of the smartphone, i.e. as a single, 
multifunctional device. Facebook has been criticised
133
 for developing apps that have 
the ability to access and send SMS messages on Android smartphones, although it 
responded that the function in question was part of the testing of SMS integration.
134
  
It will not be hugely surprising that this would not be possible on an iPhone, due to 
the restrictions associated with Apple’s system.135 However, apps on the iPhone can, 
in terms of technology, access information stored on the smartphone such as a contact 
list (name, phone number, etc). This is restricted by the Developer Agreement, which 
requires consent to be sought before this information is accessed or uploaded, and the 
Review Guidelines, which provide (17.2) that ‘apps cannot transmit data about a user 
without obtaining the user’s prior permission and providing the user with access to 
information about how and where the data will be used’. It has been suggested that 
greater protection could be ensured by building in the requirement for consent into the 
Apple API used for access to this data,
136
 and while a number of members of 
Congress were beginning to consider the matter, Apple agreed to do so in the near 
future.
137
 A social networking app, Path, was the subject of adverse media coverage 
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for failure to comply with this requirement,
138
 provoking comprehensive reviews of 
the actions of a range of apps.
139
 
The privacy risks associated with the use of apps are clearly touching a nerve of sorts 
at the moment. The FTC has recognised this through the publication of new 
marketing guidelines
140
 and there are indications that privacy fears are having an 
impact on smartphone and app usage.
141
 Whether a clear theme has been identified is 
not easy to say. The situations discussed in this section, though, do point to the role of 
the app store in whatever solution emerges. With the Californian scheme relying to a 
great extent on the store as a protector of privacy, and the affordances of the store 
being a key factor in the extent of potential breaches more generally, there may be 
some support for an interventionist approach to app approval, in so far as doing so 
would protect user privacy. The problems of definition or medium specificity that are 
highlighted in the discussion of ecommerce, above, are not apparent in the case of 
privacy. Yet there is still a certain difficulty in reconciling the desire for store-based 
regulation with the weaknesses of such an approach, as considered in part 2, above. 
The paradox remains that a trade-off between self-protection and rights to expression 
is the theme of the iOS App Store,
142
 but even if appropriate, the growth of the App 
Store means that the ‘benefits’ of security may be lessened, as will be discussed in 
part 4 of this article.  
3.3 Game and media regulation 
In the consideration of consumers and citizens, we can finally develop the idea that 
app regulation (in terms of the interests of the consumer and of the wider notion of 
protection of the public) is a site of conflict between regulation through law and 
regulation by Apple and others, through consideration of content regulation.  
Smartphones are a popular platform for video games, without a doubt. The appeal of 
Angry Birds (even to middle-aged prime ministers)
143
 is a visible manifestation of 
games as apps and iPhones as gaming devices – although Angry Birds has gradually 
expanded to other platforms, ranging from other smartphones to Facebook to board 
games. This comes as a further development to a broader shift within gaming in what 
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Juul calls a ‘casual revolution’.144 Juul was writing before iPhone games took off, but 
his identification of online Flash games in particular assists in explaining why the link 
between gaming and apps is so important. Games and entertainment are the most 
popular categories in the iOS App Store,
145
 while casual gaming developers are 
already seeing the majority of their games available through app stores rather than 
mobile carriers
146
.  
This shift from mobile carriers to the Internet recalls the discussion of carrier-
developer relationships in part 2, although it also reduces the influence of mobile-
specific rating bodies, such as the Independent Mobile Classification Body 
(IMCB).
147
 The IMCB supports the ‘rating’ of certain mobile content as unsuitable for 
under 18s (by reference to its own policy on standards, although the rating is carried 
out by content providers) and the resulting information is used by carriers to support 
systems such as blocking certain content until verification of age (i.e 18 or above) has 
been completed. The system does not include material generally available on the 
Internet, as it is focused on content provided directly through carriers rather than 
merely through the use of a carrier-provided data connection. 
Yet a direct relationship between manufacturer and game developer is not a new one, 
and Apple is just the latest manufacturer to play this role. Nintendo developed the 
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) as a family-friendly console with significant 
restrictions in its early days of any depiction of drugs, ‘foul language’, smoking and 
alcohol,
148
 and it can be observed that Apple’s approach echoes this – although 
Nintendo has reduced its restrictions over time, to the extent that the controversial 
Manhunt 2 (at first, refused classification in the UK) is available on its Wii.
149
  
Existing statutory schemes struggle to deal with apps, thus demonstrating the 
important role played by the private schemes. In the UK, the Video Recordings Act 
1984 (which provides that some games require statutory classification) does not 
extend to games other than those supplied in physical format (e.g. on a disc or 
cartridge).
150
 Although the opportunities exemption from the Act (excluding less 
problematic games e.g. those suitable for younger children) has been substantially 
reduced through amendment (adopted in 2010
151
 and implemented in 2012
152
), no 
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change has been made to the position of games in the form of apps. The voluntary, 
European Commission-supported PEGI Online system
153
 does include some games 
not within the scope of UK legislation, but the focus is online versions of existing 
console systems.  
The body that classifies games under the self-regulatory system in the United States, 
the Entertainment Software Ratings Board (ESRB), has suggested that its system 
should be used for games in the App Store.
154
 Recently, an agreement between the 
ESRB and the CTIA (a trade association for mobile phone carriers) provides for the 
use of ESRB ratings on carrier game stores (and Microsoft’s),155 but this does not 
apply to the iOS App Store or to app stores not associated with the participating 
parties (in particular, the Android Market). As such, the lack of participation by Apple 
and the Android Market may mean that the ESRB will have limited influence over 
apps more generally. Apple’s app rating scheme (assigned automatically in response 
to a ‘matrix’ filled out by a submitting developer)156 is one of four categories: 4+, 9+. 
12+ and 17+, while the Android Market uses four categories (assigned in the same 
way) of Everyone, Low Maturity, Medium Maturity and High Maturity; neither can 
be aligned to any of the statutory or non-statutory schemes discussed here. 
Australia’s elaborate scheme for the regulation of media content across platforms also 
demonstrates the difficulty of app regulation. Games are subject to statutory 
classification under a National Classification Scheme, while Internet content is also 
regulated through a regulatory authority (with the potential for it being ‘refused 
classification’ i.e. banned, albeit not based on preclearance). It was determined in 
2011 that ‘mobile and online games be treated similarly to other online content’ 157 
i.e. capable of being made available and complained about but not requiring the use of 
the games rating system unless the game was subsequently classified. Legislation to 
this end was introduced in late 2011, creating a category of ‘exempt online game’ for 
a two-year period, but is still under consideration by the Senate.
158
 In the meantime, 
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the position of games and apps more generally has been considered during the major 
reviews of Australian media law.
159
 
Another class of apps, small in number but potentially associated with major media 
enterprises, may fall under the auspices of the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive,
160
 because the app is the means of access to ‘TV-like’ audiovisual content, 
i.e. an on-demand audiovisual media service.
161
 So how does this affect apps? ‘Online 
games’ are excluded from the Directive,162 but a video-on-demand service distributed 
through any electronic communications network (including the Internet) can fall 
within the scope of regulation, if certain tests (e.g. on editorial responsibility) are met. 
While the regulatory system will vary from state to state, the Authority for Television 
on Demand (ATVOD) in the UK
163
 requires service providers to notify it of the 
provision of a service; it is not the app that is the subject of notification, but the 
content that is made available through it (although if a service is available on multiple 
platforms, a single notification is sufficient). 
The Communications Act 2003 (as amended to implement the Directive) and the 
subsequent regulatory code enforced by ATVOD require compliance with rules on 
advertising, identification, and content. In terms of content, the requirements are 
much less intensive than those applicable (under EU and UK law) to television 
broadcasting, and deal only with incitement to hatred and the protection of minors.  
However, the requirement that programmes which ‘might seriously impair the 
physical, mental or moral development of minors are only made available in such a 
way as to ensure that minors will not normally hear or see’164 the content is relevant.  
This is because ATVOD requires and Ofcom confirms
165
 that material unsuitable for 
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minors (according to the test and in particular the interpretation that this includes 
legally available material equivalent to that classified at R18 by the British Board of 
Film Classification)
166
 must only be available when subject to a content access control 
system such as initial age verification (certain credit card systems, or checks off the 
electoral register, may be appropriate) backed up by PIN or password protection for 
return visits.
167
 This means that additional protections (above and beyond those built 
in to an App Store) may be required in the case of a small number of apps. 
4. Conclusion 
The issues discussed above, while making the formulation of recommendations 
difficult, do remind the reader that main theme in the analysis of the governance 
model of the iPhone app store is tied to the iPhone’s designation as, in Zittrain’s 
terms, a tethered device. In contrast, while not quite the exemplar of generativity, 
alternatives such as the Android platform are less tethered, but allegedly suffer from 
problems in relation to fraud and abuse. However, this analysis can only ever describe 
a particular point in time, and is inherently unstable. This is shown by the emerging 
criticism of quality control of the iOS App Store, which Business Week called 
‘anarchy in the App Store’.168. The argument is that recent problems in relation to the 
App Store is a consequence of its popularity and the existence of competition: ‘as the 
Apple Store has grown to include more than 600,000 apps, and with Apple facing 
pressure from Google and Android, some worry that the company is becoming less 
vigilant about monitoring app developers, exposing users to unnecessary risks and 
shoddy apps’. 169 If the closed platform turns out to be risky after all, then the trade-off 
does not operate, at least from the point of view of the consumer, and indeed certain 
developers. The result would be either a higher baseline of risk (i.e. all users are 
exposed to a certain amount of risk), or a reaction from the platform operator that 
makes it even more closed than before (i.e. tighter rules to restore user and consumer 
confidence). The latter may be difficult given the attention that is now paid to Apple’s 
actions, by regulators, developers, and observers. Being the archetype of non-
generativity (or post-generativity) means that those who support generativity or wider 
concerns of openness will not hesitate to criticise changes in control, as we have seen 
over the past years. 
It has been argued in this article that law has a key role to play in support of Apple’s 
chosen model.  Initially, if Apple’s actions fall outside of current competition or 
telecommunications law, this may represent an advantage which depends on the 
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continued adoption of a given definition; this is particularly relevant in the context of 
telecommunications, where forms of intervention do not (yet) specifically address the 
app market.  However, the core argument is that the combination of copyright law and 
the ability to contract out of a warranty in an enforceable, valid fashion protects 
Apple’s strategy of discouraging jailbreaking. Finally, as well as Apple’s consequent 
ability to control developer actions through its management of the iOS App Store, 
apps themselves are not beyond the control of public authorities.  This means that app 
stores are not truly unregulated markets, although there is a certain lack of 
consistency regarding which legal provisions apply which suggest that they may be 
inefficiently or improperly regulated markets.  
An alternative strategy for regulation can therefore be posited. To understand it, we 
must revisit Zittrain’s dichotomy of open and closed systems. There is an aspect of 
this debate which can be readily and legitimately manipulated by public authorities, 
namely user rights. Although less apparent in the United States, the focus of Zittrain’s 
work, a European perspective makes the position clearer. The extensive legislative 
schemes for data protection and consumer rights in the EU (both founded on the need 
to harmonise law in the internal market but increasingly justified and developed as 
legislative vindication of fundamental rights) reduce the risk to the user. By doing so, 
the stark choice between closed and open platforms can become a less crucial one. 
Where users have legal rights against developers (in relation to payment, for 
example), developers are not completely free to develop any app they wish. This 
means that the theoretical concept of generativity is an aspiration rather than an 
observable state. Indeed, developers (even where few legal requirements apply) are 
already accustomed to dealing with regulation, just through Apple rather than public 
authorities.  
Nonetheless, this solution would depend on the nature of consumer and privacy laws 
that are in place. It is not just the appreciable legal wrongs of misleading the 
consumer as to the nature of a particular charge that may be alleged to be associated 
with an open platform; non-legal issues (such as stability) and issues difficult to 
prohibit even if proscribed (such as spam) are also relevant. There is also an 
appreciable difference between intervention to protect the interests of the consumer 
(regarding, for example, transparency in billing) and protecting the interests of the 
developer (which may in turn protect the interests of the consumer through supporting 
services demanded by users or facilitating competition). In particular, the former may 
be capable of being justified by reference to the inequality of arms between the 
platform operator and the end user or the vulnerable position of some consumers, 
whereas the category of developers includes some who would be considered the 
‘equals’ of the operator, such as major social networking services or news providers.  
The policy argument for including developer concerns (in their own right) within this 
proposal is restricted by the problem set out above of finding the appropriate 
comparator, although it is surely the case that future work on ‘creative industries’ and 
stimulating growth within the software, animation and game sectors should consider 
these issues in the same way that the allocation of rights or the structure of tax 
incentives already are. With these words of caution in mind, though, it can still be 
concluded that an approach of using existing provisions of law, including those 
borrowed from cognate sectors, to shift the balance between open and closed models 
and thus the degree of generativity in the smartphone and app sectors, would be 
legitimate and capable of having a demonstrable impact on the position of the end 
user. 
